### Emailed 08/22/2012 6:31 AM to Chairwoman Roberts & LNFWC from Beth Semptimphelter

Good morning Madame Chair and Commissioners,

Once again, thank you for your direction and guidance during this journey to the betterment of Colorado's forest management and protection of people. My comments and questions below may have relevance at today's LNFW presentations, or various representatives with an ability to get answers to them may be available. Thank you for this opportunity to participate in this education and investigation process.

#### PRESCRIBED FIRE PERMIT PROCESS

Please explain the permitting process for a Prescribed Fire conducted by Colorado State Fprest Service ("CSFS") on DWB lands? Air Pollution Control issues Prescribed Fire Smoke Permits for events such as the LNF Prescribed Fire ("LNFPF"). What state agency if any issues permits for the actual ignition of a Prescribed Fire? CSFS prepared, issued and implemented the Prescribed Fire Plan for the Lower North Fork. Did the state in any other capacity issue permits of any kind (besides APCD) or review the Prescribed Fire Plan prior to, during, or after the implementation thereof? How does the current Prescribed Fire process and plan work under the Division of Public Safety?

### PRESCRIBED FIRES - TEAMS' COMMUNICATIONS

The communication, or lack thereof, among and between CSFS's LNFPF management team, and its teams in the field including the burn, ignition, lookout patrol, holding, mop-up personnel and bosses, created a huge gap of understanding, guidance and experience that allowed the prescribed fire to smolder unattended and create the wildfire that killed three innocent people. How is the Division of Public Safety achieving a strong line of communications within its teams necessary to competently complete a prescribed fire?

### COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT AND PLANNING WITH LOCAL RESPONDERS

Can prescribed fire plans be displayed in local fire departments, libraries, and post offices? Can the plans be available on line? The threat and risk remains real. The LNFW has proved that. Please require the Division of Public Safety to share proposed Prescribed Fire Plans with the public, as well as with the local fire and emergency responder groups. The LNFPF's local fire departments received nothing - no plan to review, no ability to identify access roads or water sources, nothing to help them assist in a potential escape - except a phone call. No contingency plan for escape was shared. Our local fire departments have a much better handle on current forest conditions in their districts. Their input must be sought and included in any future prescribed fires in Colorado.

We know nearby neighbors in the LNFPF area never received written explanation of an upcoming burn or its potential and risk of escape, or basic contact information with phone numbers. Those neighbors are the same people who continued to believe their 911 responders knew what they were talking about, and were subsequently killed by a raging wildland fire, not a prescribed fire.

In fact the Kuehster ridge neighborhood which is less than 2 miles from the LNFPF burn site, was never considered a residential area of concern to be notified or evaluated on any CSFS or any other LNFPF related document I've seen. These neighborhood areas were listed in the plan: Dome Rock, Longview, South Platte, Buffalo Creek, Pine and Conifer.

Transparency will help our citizens regain confidence in our state and local agencies. Knowledge can save lives. A lesson is learned when we change our behavior. CSFS protocols were not followed.

### UNIFORMITY THROUGHOUT COLORADO'S EMERGENCY AND FIRST RESPONDERS

What can the Commission recommend to immediately achieve uniformity throughout Colorado's emergency response and mobilization systems, including fire, police, 911 in all its possibilities, dispatch, in volunteer and paid positions, at all levels from small rural cities and counties to our largest cities and districts, so communications and mobilization problems never again hinder the response of those dedicated to serving and preserving our forests and people, and we're assured incorrect and inadequate information will not be what is shared and provided to our citizens who may be at risk due to any fire, especially those fires set by man's hand like with prescribed fire, which are used to manage future potential forest fire danger? Budgetary considerations aside, how can our systems become better quickly?

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### WRITTEN NOTICE WITH PRESCRIBED FIRES

How will the Division of Public Safety ensure that proper, adequate, and timely written notice is provided in the future to those Colorado communities directly affected by any proposed prescribed fire? I know of no one in the vicinity of Denver Water's Lower North Fork Prescribed Fire in March 2012 that received any written notice prior to the prescribed fire. In fact no one I've spoken with ever received a written or verbal notice of CSFS's activities relating to burning Denver Water lands in the South Platte watershed area over the past six years. CSFS's DWB LNFPF Plan, page 7, 'Prescribed Fire Notification' section states, "Letters will be sent to each of the nearby neighbors to explain the burn and precautions that will be taken to avoid an escaped fire. CSFS \_\_\_\_ (blacked out) will be available for more in-depth discussions with landowners in the area." What has been done or will be done to make the public believe it will be properly notified in the future if a prescribed fire is to occur in their community?

### UPDATE PRESCRIBED FIRE PLANS MORE REGULARLY

Denver Water's Lower North Fork Prescribed Fire Plan was originally drafted by Jim Webb of Forest Stewardship Concepts on May 29, 2006. When the Plan was implemented and ignited on March 22, 2012, it then escaped as a wildland fire on March 26, 2012. Advancements in fire, fuel and forest management, as well as changing landscapes in our wildland urban interface, should require a more strategic review and implementation process for prescribed fire plans. Requiring a check of fire stations' phone numbers, geographic location, and available and operating equipment and personnel could be very helpful when mutual aid is needed. How has the Division of Public Safety's permitting or review process for prescribed fires changed from that which CSFS followed?

#### MASTICATED FUELS WITHIN PRESCRIBED FIRES

The forest management process that creates masticated wood piles throughout our state's forests seems to be a subject of interest and concern in Denver Water's LNF Prescribed Fire Plan, as well as in the April 23, 2012 Review and Recommendations: Enhancing Fire Response and Management in CO State Government's report. Masticated wood piles comprising about 60 acres in the Fourmikle Canyon Fire created an additional large fire fighting problem in October 2010. This technique should be re-evaluated to determine whether it is a healthy and responsible way for Colorado to thin and manage its forests, especially when this type of fuel load is prevalent in those areas considered for prescribed fire. Is the segregating of masticated fuels as discussed in Recommendation #5 of the 4/23/12 Review report to be followed? USFS's Rocky Mountain Research Station has studied masticated fuels, but is enough known about its burning properties to know it is a safe way to rid our forests of trees - by crunching them up and leaving piles scattered throughout?

### WITNESSES PROPOSED

I understand each Commissioner was to compile a list of potential witnesses sometime around the middle of July and present it to your Chairperson. Having not yet seen any witness recommendations, I'd like to offer the following potential witnesses which I've gathered during my review of documents relating to the LNFPF and subsequent wildfire.

JCSO Dispatch Center Shift Commander, and employees on duty for 03/26/12 Joe Duda, Acting Head, CSFS Allan Gallamore, CSFS, District Forester, Golden Rob Kriegbaum, CSFS, Technician II, Golden Rocco Snart, CO Division of Fire Safety, Acting Chief Chief Curt Rogers, North Fork Fire Protection District Chief Bill McLaughlin, Elk Creek Fire Protection District Chief Dave Macbean, Inter-Canyon Fire Department Kevin Michalak, CSFS, Burn Boss trainee 3/26/12, Golden Kirk Will, CSFS, Burn Boss, Assistant District Forester, Golden Claire Brown, CSFS, Field Duty Officer 3/26/12 Don Roach, JCSO Investigator Rvan Cox. CSFS, Firefighter, Golden Jim Webb, DWB, author of original 5/2006 DWB's LNF Prescribed Fire Plan Bill Bass, author of LNFPrescribed Review, Big Horn National Forest, WY Jacob Ware, Elk Creek Fire Protection District, Firefighter Andy Parker, JeffCo Incident Management Type 3 Team, Planning and Operations Chief Sam Parsaons, LNFPF Holding Boss, Fairmount Fire Protection District Paul Broyles, LNFPF Incident Commander

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Tim Foley, CSFS, LNFPF Reviewer 10/2011 Ronnie Newman, Jefferson County Sheriff

I'd ask that the Commission make public all interviews and meetings with first responders.

### ADVANCED TRAINING/LICENSE FOR PRESCRIBED FIRE EXERCISES

With repeated and excessive dry conditions in our state's forests, and with the enormous loss of Colorado's natural resources and personal property from recent wildland and forest fires, and with possible future use of the forest management technique of prescribed fires, it seems prudent to require advanced training of those individuals in charge of igniting our forests. Burn bosses might be the level to start requiring additional training, licensure or certification. Can the Commission recommend that the Division of Public Safety examine the current level of experience, training and certification required for individuals in management positions for prescribed fires, to ensure those individuals are experts?

### COMMUNITY WILDFIRE PROTECTION PLAN

The Kuehster ridge neighborhood and adjacent area has not been inventoried, mapped or included in either the North Fork Fire Protection District's or Inter-Canyon Fire's 2007 Community Wildfire Protection Plans. I believe Rocco Snart discussed the CWPP and the LNF area at the Commission's August 13th meeting. I do not believe our neighborhood has been inventoried and mapped for inclusion in any CWPP.

### IMPROVED ADVANCED TRAINING/LICENSE FOR 911 DISPATCH

I don't know what training or certification is required of any 911 or related dispatch agency personnel employed and in use in Colorado. As Daryl Branson told us at the Commission's August 13 meeting, the systems used throughout the state vary widely. Can our citizen's needs be better met with improved and additional training required of those answering our 911 calls?

Is First Call Network still a provider of services to the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office? Has the reverse 911 system that sent out JCSO's first LNFW emergency notification on March 26, 2012, which was sent to everyone in JCSO's system instead of just those located close to the actual fire, been tested or reviewed since this event?

Is there a mechanism in place - once an emergency evacuation or similar order has been made - for JCSO dispatch to make return phone calls to those people who previously called regarding the same event? Can this be a recommendation from the Commission for 911s statewide?

I'll provide to your staff today copies of this email and some relevant documents which the Commission hasn't yet received as far as I know:

- 1. North Fork Fire March 24, 2012 Incident Report re: Smoke Investigation at LNFPF area CSFS advised NF "all the smoke is within the black, their engine was in the area earlier" and to stand down;
- 2. Elk Creek Fire's Run Report of March 26, 2012, which includes Chief McLaughlin's account of his activities March 26, 2012 in the LNF wildfire: note that Chief McLaughlin drove past the entrance to the prescribed fire on DW's land twice, unable to locate it with directions from dispatch;
- 3. North Fork Fire's October 15, 2011 Incident Report re: LNF Prescribed Fire slop over and spot fires from CSFS's Oct 13, 2011 burning which ignited with wind two days after CSFS left the scene.

I respectfully request that when additional information or documents requested by the Commission from experts, speakers and others, are received that it/they be posted on your website. I believe Mike Babler was asked to review the specific plan documents for the LNFPF, and it would be something like his response that I would ask to be posted.

A lesson is learned when we change our behavior. May the many lessons we are learning from the LNFW's tragedy become real change in Colorado's forest management. Thanks for your time, talents and efforts to be a voice for the victims of the LNFW. Your commitment is appreciated. peace

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
**Elk Creek EMS** 

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PO Box 607, Conifer, CO 80433

Phone: 3038169385 Fax:3038169376 NFIRS-1 03 | 26 | 2012 120214 I.CO I 05930 Basic Siztion Incident Numb ate that the s **Location Type** Check this box to indicate that Fire Module in Section B, "Alto В ve Location Specification," Use only for wildland fires. Street address Intersection In front of Conifer CO | 80433 Rear of Zio Code Adjacent to Denver Water Property - off Foxton Rd in Northfork approximately 39.43575N by 105.217111W χ Directions **US National Grid** Midnight is 0000 E1 **Dates and Times E**2 Shifts and Alarms Incident Type 141 Forest, woods or wildland fire Day Hour Min Sec Aid Given or Received D Aiann 13:53:00 03 26 2012 1 Mutual aid received are the 05978 **E**3 **Special Studies** |[8 2 Local Option Automatic aid received heir FDID 3 X Mutual aid given CO-JEX-175 Arrival 03 26 2012 14:35:00 Automatic aid given Their incident Number CONTRO Other aid given 06 2012 Controlled 04 06:00:00 None LAST UN FARET Last Unit 06 04 2012 09:00:00 Cleared G2 Estimated Dollar Losses and Values G1 Resources **Actions Taken** Establish fire lines (wildfire) 13 LOSSES: Property \$ 53 | Evacuate area Apparatus Personnel Suppression Contents \$ 18 Additional Action Taken (2) Incident command **EMS** 2 PRE-INCIDENT VALUE: Optional Additional Action Taken (3) Property \$ Other 2 Contents \$ Check box if n Mixed Use Property H<sub>3</sub> Hazardous Materials Release **Completed Modules** Casualties H1 00 Mixed use, other Special HazMat actions required or spill >= 55 gal. Structure Fire-3 Natural gas: slow leak, no evac, or HazMat actions 10 Assembly use 1 Civilian Fire Cas.-4 [3 Propane gas - Less than a 21 lb. tank 20 Educational use 2 Fire Service Cas.-5 Gasoline - vehicle fuel tank or portable container 33 H2 Detector EMS\_6 40 Residential use Kerosene - fuel-burning equipment/portable storage HazMat-7 51 Row of stores Diesel fuel/fuel oil - vehicle fuel tank/portable Detector alerted occupants 5 WildLand Fire-8 Household/office solvent or chemical spill 2 6 Detector did not alert occupants X Apparatus-9 Motor oil - from engine or portable container 58 Business and residential use Unknown X Personnel-10 Paint - spills less than 55 gallons 59 8 Arson-11 60 N None



### Remarks

On the mornings of March 21, 22 and 23 I received a call from the Golden office of the Colorado State Forestry Sergice informing the district that CSFS was conducting prescribed burns on Denver Water Board property in the North Fork Fire District.

On March 27th at about 0600 I checked the weather forecast, having noted a red flag warning posted the previous day. I noticed the forecast winds had been upgraded to 40mph with gusts to 80mph possible, and a relative humidity in the single digits. On arrival at the station, I directed the crews to "dress in

greens" (wildland PPE), and to see if we could find a few extra volunteers to increase our staffing. At 1100 the district was toned for a grass fire on Sutton road in Aspen Park. On arrival, we found a 1/4 acre grass fire threatening structures. Brush 451, 452 and 454, Engine 434, Ambulance 486 and Tender 461 responded along with Command 484. The fire was contained by 1200 and apparatus were clearing. I was still on scene of the grass fire when a second call came in for a smoke column visible to the Southeast of 11111 Callae Drive. The call was toned at 1348. Assistant Chief Joe Page responded to that location, and directed other units to stage at Elk Creek Fire Station 1. I went enroute from Sutton road toward station 1, when we received another tone at 1358. The call was a request for one type 6 engine for mutual aid to the Denver Water Board property on Foxton Road for a 1 acre "slopover" from a previous controlled burn. I turned around on Highway 285 and headed down Foxton Road, and directed Brush 451 to respond.

I asked Jeffco dispatch to clarify the location, and was told it was "6 miles down Foxton and through the open gate." There was a significant column of white smoke visible east of Foxton, consistent with 5 acres burning. I saw four gates as I was travelling south, and asked again for calrification of the location. Jeffco dispatch replied that they did not have any further information on access. I turned around at the Platte River Road and went back North. I went through one open gate to a residence and met the resident there. The resident indicated he though access was through Platte View Road, a gated access to the vacant Reynolds Reserve subdivision. On arrival at Platte View, I was contacted by Brush 451 who indicated they had located a gate partially hidden from the road, just south of Platte View. They indicated they were flagging the gate with pink flagging, at approximately 1435. I requested an additional type 6 engine and a tender just before arrival.

While enroute south on Foxton, I heard Jeffco report to Chief Rogers that they were going to try to patch NFFD channel to the county 800 channel so there would be contact between the incident and the county DEM. After approximately one minute, Chief rogers requested that patch be discontinued as it was causing feedback.

Jeffco called back and indicated the fire was now reported as approximately 5 acres.

I located the gate and drove through, followed by Brush 451, arriving at approximately . After approximately one mile, we found the fire. I estimated its size at 6 to 10 acres at that time. North Fork Chief Rogers and one North Fork type 6 engine were on scene, along with a type 6 CSF3 engine. At that time, I stated on the radio that the fire had high spread potential, and that 'we should think about evacuations of Reynolds and potentially further

I spoke with Chief Rogers and asked who was Command. He indicated that Kurt Mahalik of CSFS was in charge. I attempted to raise him on the radio in 484 and could not. Chief Rogers stated he had also requested a tender and it was enroute.

Mahalik arrived from along the south end of the fire on a utility terrain vehicle (UTV). I introduced myself and asked what he needed. He asked if I could start my brush engine wet lining the west flank. I directed them to do so. I asked Mahalik if there was a dozer on order. He stated there was not. I told him I did not think there was a chance of catching the fire without one. He said no dozers were available, but that he had 2 more type 6 engines coming. I asked Mahalik how far off the jeep track at the south end of the fire had the fire burned. He said he did not know, because there was too much smoke.

At approximately 1500, Jeffco notified us that the CSFS had ordered a type 3 IMT.

Assistant Chief Page was staged at Reynolds Open Space Park. I directed him to go to the top of the Reynolds Reserve to serve as a lookout. Mahalik asked if he could ride with me up to that ridge and see the north end of the fire. I agreed, and we went in that direction, followed by Rogers. While going up Platte View, we caught up with Page, who was stuck in the snow. One of the Jeffco deputies was also trying to go up that road. He stayed to pull Page out, and Rogers, Mahalik and I continued up to the top. It was not possible to see the head of the fire due to the smoke. I called to Page, asked him to continue, and to walk East on the ridge top to find a lookout site. Mahalik, Rogers and I headed back to the Denver Water Board property. Once back at the water board property, FF Alex Parks from Brush 451 came to me and said they were not making any progress with a wet line, and that fuels would re-ignite as soon as they stopped spraying them. I relayed that to Mahalik, and he asked that they start a scratch line to try and anchor that flank. I relayed that to Parks. I told Parks not to try to get in front of the fire, as the flank fire at that time had 6 to 10 flames lengths and the wind was increasing. Brush 454 had arrived and I directed them to assist 451. Tender 462 arrived and I asked them to set up water supply at Foxion Road. I told Mahalik that I did not think wet line tactics were going to be effective with the fire behavior present, and advised him to consider evacuating ahead of the fire. At that time a gust came along, blowing my hardhal off and knocking one of the firefighters down. Other firefighters took shelter behind the engines, as the wind was too strong to stand upright. I asked Mahalik what he would like for me to do and he asked that I accompany him to the southeast end of the fire to scope out that side of the fire. We drove there in the CSFS UTV. The head of the fire was obscured by smoke, but there was flanking fire with 8 to 20 foot flame lengths where the fire was getting into jackpots of fuel. It appeared to be out of the treatment area. The CSFS firefighters were re-erecting the folding tank used for the prescribed fire and putting in a hoselay. The North Fork Tender moved to that end of the fire to assist and fill the tank. At Mahalik's request, I sent my brush engines to We returned to the SW comer and met again with Chief Rogers. We discussed contingencies in the event that direct attack would not stop the fire. Mahalik stated there was a road around the unit on the far side of the drainage, and a fuel break midslope above that. I expressed the opinion that neither was likely to stop the fire when it started burning uphill from the bottom of the drainage. Chief Rogers indicated that if the fire reached the bottom of the drainage, an evacuation should be requested. I pulled out a topographic map and we looked at the possible path of the fire. The topo map was dated 1994 and had few structures shown. I was not familiar with the area and asked Chief Rogers what was in that area. He stated that there was more than shown on the map, but he was not sure how much. I called our station 1 on the radio and asked them to assemble a task force for possible structure protection. I told them the area it appeared the fire was headed toward. Deputy Chief Igel was at the station and he indicated that some of that area was in Inter-Canyon Fire District and suggested they be Elk Creek firefighter Jacob Ware called on the phone and suggested he take on a role as Fire Observer in the area north of the fire. I directed him to do so, and he began scouting the Kuehster Road area. Mahalik indicated he was going to go out the road that went around the north side of the drainage. I said I would stay to brief the additional resources coming in. Soon after that, someone reported the fire had crossed the drainage. I looked in that direction, and the fire was starting to make a crown run up the north side. I told Page to get off the ridge, and watched to make certain he exited successfully. The fire appeared to be moving about 200-300 feet per Rogers asked that I meet him and Mahalik at the Reynolds Park parking lot. I started in that direction, and told the Elk Creek task force to respond. I also asked for any mutual aid we could get from the local departments. On the way out I met up with Tender 462, and found that one of the firefighters was a rookie who had not completed training. I directed that rookie to travel with me out of the fire area. While enroute to the park, I observed a major column, already apparently up to one mile north if the origin. On arrival at the Reynolds Park lot, I met again with Mahalik and Rogers and they asked that I be part of unified command. I stated that the fire was not in my fire district. Rogers said that it would be soon, so I agreed. Rogers had asked for an evacuation area of lower Kuehster road, and had requested three strike teams of engines. I borrowed the mobile for Scott Halliday (sheriff's office) to talk directly with Rocco Snart (Jefferson County sheriff) and asked him to increase the request to five strike teams and to expand the evacuation area to all of Kuehster Road south of Pleasant Park Road. Mark Gulke from the Sheriff's office was at Reynold's Park and suggested we move the ICP to Elk Creek station 4. We went to station 4. I requested the task force respond to there. On arrival there, we met with Allen Gallamore from CSFS. At that time, he made a verbal request for Rogers and I to take command of the fire, under a verbal delegation of authority. We accepted. Gutke indicated that the Jefferson County IMT had not been formally requested. I made the request, and asked that the IMT take command of the fire as soon as possible. I also requested that Inter-Canyon's duty officer report to the ICP to be part of the unified command. I appointed Igel as Task Force Leader, and sent them to assist Inter-canyon in evacuating. One engine from Platte Canyon arrived along with assistant chief Joe Burgett. I requested Burgett take Structure Protection Group Supervisor. The task force consisted of engine 431, engine 433, engine 434, brush 452, tender 461, tender 462 and pump truck 457. Ambulance 487 responded to

provide medical. Perry Otero from Inter-Canyon arrived and agreed to be part of the unified command. At that time, we decided to move the ICP to station 1.

Once at station 1, we set up ICP in the meeting room. Members of the IMT trickled in over the night and began assisting with the operation. During the

night we coordinated fire observations and evacuation areas and worked to gather intelligence on the resources on the fire At around midnight, I met with Boyd Lebeda with CSFS and he requested that I formally assume Incident Command under a delegation of authority until 0600 when the Jefferson County IMT was scheduled to take over the fire. I agreed.

During the night, the elk Creek Task Force continued to assist in structure protection, evacuation, and patrol of the fire.

At 0600 on the 27th, the Jefferson County IMT took command of the fire.

From 0600 until the fire was turned back over to a type 4 incident, Elk Creek provided engines and tenders to the incident. Pete Igel remained on as Task Force Leader and I remained on as Agency Rep, and managed interagency cooperation with the other fire districts.

Reported - escaped control burn Found - CSFS requested 1 Type 6 engine from Elk Creek for an escaped controlled burn. North Fork Fire also requested. Actions Taken - Responded and established fire lines. Weather - 67 degrees, hazy, 10 mph SW, gusts to 60 mph @1511 became call #120215 - became call CO-JEX-000176

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4	<sup>ID</sup> 461 Type 24	Dispatch X Arrival Clear	03/26/12	1402 	Sent 2	Other  X Suppression EMS	92
5	ID 454 Type 16	Dispatch X Arrival Clear	03/26/12	1402 	Sent 2	Other  X Suppression EMS	92
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7	ID 464 Type 24		Dispatch Arrival Clear	×	03/26/12			402		Sent X	<u>1</u>	Other  X Suppression  EMS	
	Personnel ID	1	Name		Rani	k Or Gra	de	Action	Taken	Acti	ion Taken	Action Tak	en Action Taken

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085

### **North Fork Fire Protection District**

Station: 1

Location: **Foxton RD** Foxton CO 80441 River Rd.

Lat/Long: N 39° 26' 54.66" W 105° 14′ 55.62"

Location Type: 2 - Intersection Population Density: Rural Cross Street, Directions or National Grid: River Rd.

Incident Type: 632 - Prescribed fire

FDID: 05978 Incident #: 2012-20 Exposure ID: 4204852

Exposure #: 0

Incident Date: 03/24/2012 Dispatch Run #: 2012-20

Report Completed by:	Rogers , Curt D.	<b>ID:</b> 1201	Date: 03/26/2012	
Report Reviewed by:	Rogers , Curt D.	<b>ID:</b> 1201	Date: 03/26/2012	
Report Printed by:	Brown, Ann E.	<b>ID:</b> 1220	Date: 3/27/2012 Time: 08:27	

Structure Ty	ype: Prope	erty Use: 669 - Fo	rest,	timbe	rland, v	woodlan	d		
Automatic E	Extinguishme	ent System Present	: 0	Detect	ors Pres	sent: 🗌	Cause of 1	Ignition:	
Aid Given o	r Received:	None	Prin	nary ac	tion tak	ten:	84 -	Refer to proper authority	
Losses	2	Pre-Incident V	alues						
Property:	\$0.00	Property:	\$0.00	D	Civilian	Injuries:	0	Fire Service Injuries:	0
Contents:	\$0.00	Contents:	\$0.00	D	Civilian	Fatalities	: <b>0</b>	Fire Service Fatalities:	0
Total:	\$0.00	Total:	\$0.00	0	Total C	asualties:	. 0	Total Fire Service Casualties:	0
Total # of a	apparatus or	r call:			1	Total #	of personn	iel on call:	2

### **NARRATIVE**

Called to a smoke investigation in the area of Lower North Fork prescribed burn. Had dispatch contact CSFS they advised all the smoke is within the black their engine was in the area earlier. CSFS advised NF units could stand down. Curt D. Rogers, Chief

APPARATUS	277 1 200 200	2 A			
Unit		1253	E	e e	
Туре:	100	Brush truck	27	18) 181 F <del>T</del> 8	
Use:		Suppression	n*	201	202 X X
Response Mode:	-	Lights and Sirens			1983
# of People		2	9		F #
Injury Or Onset		03 /24/2012 16:25:00			
Alarm	2 8 2	03 /24/2012 16:25:00			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Dispatched	2 34	03 /24/2012 16;25:00			222222
Enroute		03 /24/2012 16:28:00			the color schools of
Arrived	is .	-/-/:-:-		7 × 1	
Cancelled		03 /24/2012 16:30:00	7 <del>7</del> 3	B E N	0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
Cleared Scene		-/-/:-:-			
In Quarters		03 /24/2012 16:32:00	- 2000		
In Service	5	03 /24/2012 16:30:00		1 200 to 500 VI 5550 5	
Number Of People not or	apparatus: 0			# 2 B # #### 2	

PERSONNEL ON CALL		
Name	Personnel Rank	Apparatus
Graves, John R.	Firefighter/EMT-B	1253

Rogers, Curt D.	Chief/EMT-I	1253	
Member Making Report (Chief	/EMT-I Curt D. Rogers):		
e de la companya del companya de la companya del companya de la co			
Supervisor (Chief/EMT-I Curt	D. Rogers):		

E.

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# North Fork Fire Protection District

Station: 1

Location:
7 S 70 W
15 SENW 06
FDID: 05978
Incident #: 2011-161

Exposure ID: 3610581
Exposure #: 0
Incident Date: 10/15/2

Incident Date: 10/15/2011 Dispatch Run #: 2011-161

Report Completed by:	Rogers , Curt D.	<b>ID:</b> 1201	Date: 10/16/2011
Report Reviewed by:	Rogers , Curt D.	<b>ID:</b> 1201	Date: 10/16/2011
Report Printed by:	Brown, Ann E.	<b>ID:</b> 1220	Date: 10/31/2011 Time: 14:06

Structure T	ype: Prope	erty Use: 669	- Forest, timbe	erland,	woodland			
Automatic E	Extinguishme	ent System Pres	sent: 🗆 Detec	tors Pre	sent: 🔲 Fire	e Cause	: Debris, vegetation burn	
Aid Given o	r Received:	None	Primary actio	n taken:	17 -	Manag	e prescibed fire (wildland)	
Losses		Pre-Inciden	t Values					
Property:	\$0.00	Property:	\$0.00	Civilia	n Injuries:	0	Fire Service Injuries:	0
Contents:	\$0.00	Contents:	\$0.00	Civilia	n Fatalities:	0	Fire Service Fatalities:	0
Total:	\$0.00	Total:	\$0.00	Total (	Casualties:	0	Total Fire Service Casualties:	0
Total # of apparatus on call:				2	Total # of p	personr	el on call:	3

### **NARRATIVE**

Called to the Lower North Fork prescribed burn on a smoke column. Dispatch advised RP is Denver Water Board employee and fire is on their property which has been conducting prescribed fire in the prior week. This burn is being conducted by the CSFS. U/A located 1/4 acre fire burning in the ridge top of a presc ibed fire unit. This fire appears to be outside of a black lining operation that occurred on 10-13-2011. The fire is located on the N side of a 4x4 road in the area, all black lining operations appear to have occurred on the S side of the road. It does appear as though they had a small 1/10 acre "slop over" during black lining operations as apparent by line construction in the area. Current burn activity is directly adjacent to this area. There are also several smokes in the black line on the S side of the road. It is apparent this activity is ascoiciated with winds(10-15mph) that have occurred this afternoon. This fire is considered to be a "slop over" of the prescribed fire and with-in the management area. However suppression will occur since it is beyond fuel breaks and divisions for the unit.

Fire Size-up: Fire burning in Pondrsosa and Doug. Fir understory with grass, and masticated unit approx. 5 years previous. Character of the fire is creeping and smoldering, torching in the fir, spotting with the wind. Located on the upper 1/3 of the slope. Winds 5-10 from the west. Slope 20%. Wind is overriding the slope and pushing downhill. Additional concerns are snags and winds. Two spot fires less than 1/10 acre ignited from winds.

Suppression: Direct attack including wet line to control torching and hot spots along the line. Fire contained at 1/2 acre approx. 18:00. CSFS contacted via dispatch to advise of situation, they responded with Type 4 & 6. Mop-up continued after containment. Command transferred to CSFS for continued mop-up. NF units cleared the scene.

Curt D. Rogers, Chief

Unit	1251	Unit	1272
Type:	Brush truck	Туре:	Tanker & pumper combination
Use:	Suppression	Use:	Suppression
Response Mode:	Lights and Sirens	Response Mode:	Lights and Sirens
# of People	1	# of People	2
Injury Or Onset	10 /15/2011 15:14:00	Injury Or Onset	10 /15/2011 15:14:00
Alarm	10 /15/2011 15:14:00	Alarm	10 /15/2011 15:14:00
Dispatched	10 /15/2011 15:14:00	Dispatched	10 /15/2011 15:14:00
Enroute	10 /15/2011 15:16:00	Enroute	10 /15/2011 15:20:00
Arrived	10 /15/2011 15:45:00	Arrived	10 /15/2011 15:50:00
Cancelled	/ / : :	Cancelled	//:



Cleared Scene	10 /15/2011 19:15:00	Cleared Scene	10 /15/2011 19:15:00			
In Quarters	10 /15/2011 19:45:00	In Quarters	10 /15/2011 19:45:00			
In Service	10 /15/2011 19:45:00	In Service	10 /15/2011 19:45:00			
Number Of People not on apparatus: 0						

WILDLAND FIRE			
LOCATION		24	
Township	7	Township Direction	S
Range	70	Range Direction	W
Wildland Section	15	Subsection	SENW
Meridian	06	Area Type	1
CAUSE OF FIRE			
Wildland Fire Cause	Debris, vegetation t	ourn ,	
Human Factors Contributing	None		
Factors Contributing To Ignition	Agriculture or land i	management burns , High wind	
OTHER FACTORS			
Fire Suppression Factor 1	Fire Suppression Facto	r 2 Fire Suppression Fa	ctor 3
Drought or low fuel moisture	Humidity, low	Unusual vegetation fue	
Heat Source	Flying brand, ember, spark	Mobile Property Type	
WEATHER	<u> </u>		
Weather Station ID		Weather Type	Clear, less than 1/10 cloud cover
Wind Direction	West	Wind Speed	15
Temperature	70	Negative Temperature Flag	False
Humidity	14	Fuel Moisture	
Fire Danger Rating	Very high fire dange	er	
DAMAGE/PROPERTY			
Total Acres Burned	.5	Were Any Crops Burned	No
Property Management Code	City, town, village or other locality	Percent Of Total Acres Burned Undetermined	
Percent Of Total Acres Burned City Town Village Local	100	Percent Of Total Acres Burned County Or Parish	
NFDRS Fuel Model At Origin		Person Responsible For Fire	
C: Open pine with grass		Unknown person caused fire	
RIGHT OF WAY/FIRE BEHAVIOR			
Elevation In Feet	7000	RelativeSlopePosition	Ridge Top
Aspect	Northeast	Flame Length	2
Rate Of Spread	1		

PERSONNEL ON CALL					
Name	Personnel Rank	Apparatus			
Graves, John R.	Firefighter/EMT-B	1272			
Neuroth, Mark D.	Firefighter/EMT-B	1272			
Rogers, Curt D.	Chief/EMT-I	1251			

Member Making Report (Chief/EMT-I Curt D. Rogers):	
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2	rth.	Fork	Fire	Protection	District:	2011	-1	61
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Supervisor (Chief/EMT-I Curt D. Rogers):



## **Agricultural and Prescribed Fire Escapes**

This Topical Fire Research Report is in response to a legislative inquiry concerning the number of wildfires that are started each year in Colorado from the escape of agricultural and prescribed fires. For the purpose of this report, the term 'escape' is used to describe an agricultural controlled burn or a prescribed fire that spread beyond the control lines and became a 'hostile' fire.

### Wildland, Agricultural and Prescribed Fires, by Incident Type

In the 'typical' year between 2007 and 2011, there are 5,134 reported outside fires involving vegetative fuels in Colorado (not including prescribed fires).

Table 1
Wildland, Agricultural and Prescribed Fires, by Incident Type
2007 – 2012 (through July 31, 2012)

Outside Vegetative Fires by Incident Type	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Grand Total
Authorized controlled burning	912	1,137	1,121	997	1,111	317	5,595
Brush, or brush and grass mixture fire	1,218	1,885	1,339	1,636	1,707	438	8,223
Cultivated grain or crop fire	84	91	73	82	46	5	381
Cultivated orchard or vineyard fire	0	1	0	1	0	1_	3
Forest, woods or wildland fire	614	563	520	451	555	114	2,817
Grass fire	1,070	1,758	1,104	1,355	1,315	326	6,928
Natural vegetation fire, other	555	873	514	543	441	116	3,042
Prescribed fire	82	112	80	72	51	14	411
Grand Total	4,535	6,420	4,751	5,137	5,226	1,331	27,400

In the 'typical' year between 2007 and 2011, there were 79 reported prescribed fires in Colorado.

### **Total Acres Burned**

In the 'typical' year between 2007 and 2011, the reported outside fires involving vegetative fuels in Colorado (including prescribed fires) burn an average of 4,021 acres. The total acres burned by the wildland, agricultural and prescribed fires reported in Table 1 are reflected in the following table:

Table 2
Total Acres Burned
2007 – 2012 (through July 31, 2012)

Year	Acres Burned
2007	3,373
2008	4,951
2009	3,583
2010	4,068
2011	4,129
2012	1,024
Total Acres Burned	21,128

### **Fires Spread Beyond Control Line**

Since 2007, there have been a reported total of 1,592 fires that have spread beyond the control lines, including 753 that were identified as agriculture or land management burns. This represents 2.8% of all wildland, agricultural and prescribed fires reported.

Table 3
Fires Spread Beyond Control Line (Number)
2007 – 2012 (through July 31, 2012)

Factors Contributing (Number)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Grand Total
Agriculture or land management burns	44	173	201	127	140	68	753
Exposure fire	0	7	1	3	5	0_	16
Fire spread or control, other	20	46	42	44	34	13	199
Outside/open fire for debris or waste disposal	28	85	60	63	53	14	303
Outside/open fire for warming or cooking	10	21	18	19	17	6	91
Rekindle	20	60	40	49	38	23	230
Grand Total	122	392	362	305	287	124	1,592

The 753 fires that were identified as agriculture or land management burns, burned a total of 5,100 acres.

Table 4
Fires Spread Beyond Control Line (Acres Burned)
2007 – 2012 (through July 31, 2012)

Factors Contributing (Acres Burned)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Grand Total
Agriculture or land management burns	24	1,899	1,723	591	346	527	5,110
Exposure fire	0	12	1	0	30	0	43
Fire spread or control, other	102	600	92	1,709	147	74	2,724
Outside/open fire for debris or waste disposal	15	760	77	399	625	9	1,885
Outside/open fire for warming or cooking	1	7	38	11	21	0	68
Rekindle	8	21	219	19	207	14	488
Grand Total	150	3,299	2,150	2,719	1,376	624	10,318

### Comparison to the Federal Experience

It is estimated that federal land management agencies complete between 4,000 and 5,000 prescribed fires annually. Approximately ninety nine percent of those burns were 'successful' (in that they did not report escapes). However, that leaves 40 to 50 escapes annually. <sup>1</sup>

During the past few years, the USDA Forest Service's prescribed fire program has demonstrated a record of success and improvement. Analyses completed in 2002 and 2006 demonstrated a high rate of success and an improving trend.<sup>2</sup>

Table 5
USDA Forest Service Prescribed Fire Escapes and Success Rates

	1996-2001	2003-2005
Prescribed Fires	24,133	10,920
Annual Average	4,022	3,640
Acres Burned	6,406,217	4,928,766
Annual Average	1,067,703	1,642,922
Escapes	235	38
Annual Average	39.2	12.7
Average Success Rate	99.0%	99.7%

### **Definitions**

Authorized controlled burning – Includes fires that are agricultural in nature and managed by the property owner with any required authorization. Excludes unauthorized controlled burning and prescribed fires.

Brush or brush-and-grass mixture fire – Includes ground fuels lying on or immediately above the ground such as duff, roots, dead leaves, fine dead wood, and downed logs.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Escape Prescribed Fire Reviews and Near Miss Incidents, Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center, June 29, 2005.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Learning From Escaped Prescribed Fires – Lessons for High Reliability, Fire Management Today, Volume 66 • No. 4 • Fall 2006

Forest, woods, or wildland fire – Includes fires involving vegetative fuels, other than prescribed fire, that occur in an area in which development is essentially nonexistent, except for roads, railroads, power lines, and the like. Also includes forests managed for lumber production and fires involving elevated fuels such as tree branches and crowns. Excludes areas in cultivation for agricultural purposes such as tree farms or crops.

Grass fire – Includes fire confined to area characterized by grass ground cover, with little or no involvement of other ground fuels.

Prescribed fire – Includes fires ignited by management actions to meet specific objectives and have a written, approved prescribed fire plan prior to ignition. Excludes authorized controlled burning.

Unauthorized burning – Includes fires that are under control and not endangering property but without the required authorization.

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